Iran Energy News Oil, Gas, Petrochemical and Energy Field Specialized Channel
Related Articles
After decades of low interest in Libya’s oil and gas sector due to sanctions and the civil war, a possible new chapter could open in 2025. Based on the potential tender by the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) for 22 onshore and offshore exploration blocks, expectations are high that international oil companies (IOCs) are returning. Despite the current political and security instability, interest in Libya is growing, as evidenced by Spain’s Repsol, which is drilling its first exploration well. The main driver behind the IOC push is a security guarantee provided by the Libyan National Army (LNA) and NOC.
In December 2024, NOC announced plans to offer 22 onshore and offshore exploration blocks in 2025 to attract foreign investment and bolster the country’s energy sector. Libya’s current production levels remain far below its targets. The country claims to hold reserves of 48 billion barrels and aims to increase production to 2 million bpd in 2025, up from the current 1.5 million bpd in 2024.
Repsol began drilling its A1-2/130 exploration well on December 31, 2024, 12 kilometers from Libya’s largest oil field, Sharara. Repsol is committed to drilling six wells in its NC115 and NC186 license areas in the southwestern Murzuq basin. Concurrently, Italian major ENI and British major BP have also initiated exploration projects in partnership with the Libyan Investment Co. in Area B of the Ghadames Basin, northwest Libya. Exploration drilling at well A1-96/3 (Hasheem Prospect) is tied to the 2007 Type IV Contracting Agreement.
ENI and NOC, both partners in the 50/50 JV Melittah Oil & Gas, are overseeing drilling activities based on their experience in the Al Wafa field. NOC has stated that promising geological formations will be tested at well A1-96/3, with the final well expected to reach 3,147 meters (10,327 feet). Meanwhile, Austrian energy company OMV is currently working in the Sirte Basin. A JV involving NOC, OMV, Equinor, TotalEnergies, and Repsol, known as Akakus, is operating the Sharara oil field, aiming to boost production by around 260,000 bpd. Sharara’s production capacity is set at 320,000 bpd.
The optimism shown by IOCs and Libya’s NOC may, however, face geopolitical risks of significant magnitude. While Libya’s overall security situation is relatively stable, regional developments, especially involving Syria, Iran, and Israel, could soon have a destabilizing effect. Libyan media have recently reported discussions between Libyan government officials and Israel, sparking political unrest. However, the primary destabilizing factor in 2025 is expected to be Russia’s expanding role in Libya.
The removal of the Assad regime in Syria, resulting in the establishment of a pro-Turkish fundamentalist government and the end of Russia’s military and naval presence there, has direct implications for Libya’s security and future. Russian President Vladimir Putin is currently seeking new military bases and naval ports in the Mediterranean, with Libya being a top priority. The country serves as a critical power base for Russia’s interests and operations in Africa. Libyan ports and military bases in border regions with the Sahel are being assessed or actively built up. Russia’s supply routes to mineral-rich African nations are constrained following the loss of its bases in Syria.
In recent weeks, there has been significant movement of personnel and military equipment from Syria to Libya. Flight trackers have logged daily military transport flights from Russia’s Syrian airbase at Hmeimim to three bases in Libya since mid-December. Vessel trackers have recorded four Russian transport ships heading to the Mediterranean, likely destined for Libya with heavy equipment. The ships have turned off their AIS systems near Libya’s coast in recent days. This military buildup has set off alarm bells in NATO. Italy’s defense minister, Guido Crosetto, compared Moscow’s redeployment from Syria to Libya to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
Russia’s alignment with General Haftar, who controls several major oil and gas-producing regions, is of particular concern. Since 2014, Moscow has supported Haftar with military aid and weapons, positioning him as its main power broker in Libya. This includes granting access to ports and military bases.
A broader concern is the possibility of a renewed Russian-Turkish confrontation. Following the Turkish-backed militias’ removal of Assad in Syria, effectively ending Russia’s presence there, Libya may face a similar scenario. This time, Moscow’s stakes are higher. Without Libya, Russia’s aspirations for an African empire could collapse. A confrontation between the UN-Turkey-backed Western government and Haftar’s Russia-UAE-supported forces is increasingly plausible. Meanwhile, Russia’s oil giant Rosneft has shown interest in Libya’s vast oil and gas reserves.
Renewed instability in Libya appears imminent. Western IOCs and oilfield service companies should weigh Libya’s vast potential against the shifting military-security environment. While Libya’s oil and gas future remains promising, the growing possibility of a Russian military presence complicates the outlook.
